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Altera: Expanding the Reissue Procedure: A Better Way to Do Business

NOTE

EXPANDING THE REISSUE PROCEDURE:
A BETTER WAY TO DO BUSINESS
Continued technological development is inextricably entwined
with the fiscal prosperity of this country. To further the development of science and technology, the founding fathers granted
Congress the power to create the patent system.' Under the
system that Congress enacted, inventors claim an invention by
filing an application with the Commissioner of the Patent and
Trademark Office ("PTO").2 The application must contain a
specification3 which "shall conclude with one or more claims4
particularly pointing and distinctly claiming the subject matter
which the applicant regards as his invention.""
Once the PTO grants the patent, the inventor, also known as the
patentee, has the right to exclude others from making, using, or
selling his invention throughout the United States for seventeen

1 U.S. CONST. art. I, J 8, cl. 8 (The Congress shall have the Power ...

[t]o promote the

Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors

the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
2 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1988).
3 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to

which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and
use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the

inventor of carrying out his invention.
Id.
4 Each claim defines the patent owner's legal rights; it defines the boundaries of the

property right conferred by the patent. E.g., Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969, 974
(Fed. Cir. 1985).
5 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
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years.'
An unauthorized party who violates the patentee's
statutory rights commits literal infringement. Even if a party
does not literally infringe a patent, the court may still find infringement based upon the judicially created doctrine of equivalents.'
The doctrine of equivalents extends claims beyond the literal
interpretation of the language; i.e., it determines whether the
accused product is "equivalent" to that described by the claim
language.

The doctrine of equivalents thus is applicable for a

claim which does not "read on"'0 an allegedly infringing device
11
because one or more limitations of the claim are not met exactly.
Problems exist, however, in applying the doctrine of equivalents.
For instance, the doctrine of equivalents provides little analytical

framework.12

Additionally, problems include, among others,

procedural difficulties,"3 the failure of juries to understand complex technologies, 4 and uncertainty in the courts.
Legal writers have criticized the doctrine of equivalents for these deficien-

6 35 U.S.C.

§ 154 (1988).

7 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1982). The literal infringement inquiry is a two-step process: the

trier first interprets the claims to determine their proper scope, and then the trier must
apply those interpretations to the accused device to determine whether it infringes the
claimed invention. Palumbo, 762 F.2d at 974.
' The patentee may sue for infringement under either or both of the two legal theories:
the doctrine of equivalents or literal infringement. E.g., London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co.,
946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931,
933-39 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988).
'Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
10 "Read on' means that each technical phrase in the claim must literally describe a
corresponding element or connection in the description of the allegedly infringing product or
method. ROBERT C. FABER, LANDIS ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING § 18, at 43
n.5 (1990).
" Johnson v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
12See Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d 1320, 1325-26 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ('This
court has not set out in its precedent a definite formula for determining the equivalency
between a required limitation or combination of limitations and what has been allegedly
substituted therefor in the accused device. Nor do we propose to adopt one here.") (quoting
Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., 886 F.2d 1251, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
13See infra notes 74-87 and accompanying text.
',See infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
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While the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit17
("CAFC") continues to refine the doctrine of equivalents, the
problems remain unresolved. 8
This Note proposes a solution to the problems that exist as a
result of the doctrine of equivalents: Congress should replace the
doctrine of equivalents with an expanded reissue procedure. The
current reissue procedure functions as a correction provision by
allowing enlargement of patent claims within two years of granting
the original patent.19 The PTO grants a reissue patent, just as it
issues the original patent. The reissue procedure co-exists with the
doctrine of equivalents. A patentee could sue another party for
literal infringement or infringement under the doctrine of equivalents based upon claims in the original patent or reissue patent or
both. From the patentee's perspective, suing for literal infringement using the reissue claims may be less desirable because the
public has more protection, at the expense of the patentee, than
under the doctrine of equivalents.20
This proposed solution advocates abolishing the doctrine of
equivalents and expanding the reissue procedure to allow for
changes in patent claims over the entire life of the patent. Such an
expansion of the reissue procedure is a viable solution to many
problems in patent law while protecting the patentee's invention,

cies. 16

' 6 See generally Martin J. Adelman & Gary L. Francione, The Doctrine ofEquivalents in
Patent Law: Questions that Pennwalt did not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 673 (1989); Martin
J. Adelman, The New World of Patents Created by the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 979 (1987); Roy Collins, III, The Doctrine of Equivalents:
Rethinking the BalanceBetween Equity and Predictability,22 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 285
(1992); Henrik D. Parker, Doctrineof EquivalentAnalysis After Wilson Sporting Goods: The
Hypothetical Claim Hydra, 18 AIPLA Q.J. 262 (1990); Harold C. Wegner, Equitable
Equivalents: Weighing the Equitiesto Determine Patent Infringement in Biotechnology and
Other Emerging Technologies, 18 RUTGERs COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1 (1992).
" In 1982, Congress passed the Federal Courts Improvement Act, creating the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The CAFC hears several types of cases, but one of its
primary functions is to hear all appeals from the federal district courts involving patents.
The purpose of this single court of appeals is to unify patent doctrine. The Supreme Court
rarely reviews its decisions. See Adelman, supra note 16, at 981 n.10.
' See, eg., Parker, supra note 16, at 264 (noting that "the Federal Circuit has also
gradually expanded and complicated the basic analytical structure which patent cases are
decided").
19 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1988).
20 See infra notes 44-54 and accompanying text (discussing current reissue procedure and
intervening rights).
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thus upholding a primary function of the doctrine of equivalents.21
Section I discusses the history and present status of the doctrine
of equivalents, the current reissue procedure, and inherent
problems with the doctrine of equivalents. Section II explains the
proposed solution. In Section III, this Note analyzes the advantages of an expanded reissue procedure. Section IV discusses potential
concerns with this proposal. Last, Section V presents hypothetical
situations illustrating the benefits of the proposed solution.
I. THE HISTORY AND PRESENT STATUS OF THE DOCTRINE OF
EQUIVALENTS, THE CURRENT REISSUE PROCEDURE, AND

INHERENT PROBLEMS WITH THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS

This section discusses the historical development of the doctrine
of equivalents and then the present status of this doctrine. The
section next explains the current reissue procedure and concludes
by discussing inherent problems with the doctrine of equivalents,
both independent of and in relation to the current reissue procedure.
A. HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS

The doctrine of equivalents arose in equity. In modern times, the
doctrine of equivalents has shifted from its equitable beginnings to
a secondary infringement test that litigants frequently use.' This
Note's proposed solution better incorporates the fairness considerations of equity for both the public and the patentee than the
present doctrine of equivalents.
Historical analysis of the doctrine of equivalents frequently
23
begins with the Supreme Court case Winans v. Denmead,
21 This solution is an acceptable proposition of law. In the two most famous applicable
Supreme Court cases, the dissenting opinions stressed the importance of following acts of
Congress instead ofusing the judicially created doctrine of equivalents. Graver Tank & Mfg.
Co. v. Linde Air Prods., 339 U.S. 605, 613 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting); Winans v. Denmead,
56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 347 (1853) (Cambell, J., dissenting). Each opinion noted many
problems that have continued to plague the doctrine of equivalents jurisprudence, such as
uncertainty in the coverage of the claims. See infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text;
infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text (discussing respective dissenting opinions).
' Adelman & Francione, supra note 16, at 699; Collins, supra note 16, at 288.
56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853).
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decided in 1853.24 In Winans, the defendant's design did not
literally infringe the plaintiff's patent claims but instead incorporated the plaintiff's improvements in a different form. The plaintiff
patentee in Winans had designed a new coal transport vehicle,
shaped as a frustum cone, that allowed lighter cars to carry heavier
loads. The defendant's car, in contrast, was shaped as an octagon
with a pyramidal base. The defendant's design, although shaped
differently, achieved the same result as the patentee's invention.
The trial court found no literal infringement because the defendant's product did not fall within the patentee's claims. The
Supreme Court, basing its decision on the doctrine of equivalents,
reversed the lower court in a five-to-four decision.' The majority
began its analysis with the premise that a patent cannot be
granted merely for a change of form. The Court then held that the
jury could reasonably find that the infringing car impermissibly
incorporated the improvements from the plaintiff's patent.' The
majority ruled that "to copy the principle or mode of operation
described, is an infringement, although such copy should be totally
unlike the original in form or proportions." "
The dissent argued that the majority was circumventing
congressional intent because the statute required that the patentee
"describe his invention, in such full, clear, and exact terms, that
from the description, the invention may be constructed and
used."' The dissent further argued that nothing "will be more
mischievous, more productive of oppressive and costly litigation, of
exorbitant and unjust pretensions and vexatious demands, more
injurious to labor, than a relaxation of these wise and salutary
requisitions of the act of Congress."" The dissent thus highlighted the problems with the majority's position of incorporating equity
into an infringement analysis.

2 Cf Wegner, supra note 16, at 6 (explaining that while courts and academic writers
trace doctrine of equivalents to Winans, this starting point overlooks approximately forty

years of case law).
25 Winans, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 344.
2Id.

2Id. at 341.
I& at 347 (Cambell, J., dissenting).
T
Id
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Nearly a century later, the Supreme Court again examined the
use of the doctrine of equivalents in the oft-cited case Graver Tank
& Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products.' There, as in
Winans, the Court found infringement based on the doctrine of
equivalents."' The Court explained its infringement test under
the doctrine of equivalents as follows:
What constitutes equivalency must be determined
against the context of the patent, the prior art, and
the particular circumstances of the case. Equivalence, in the patent law, is not the prisoner of a
formula and is not an absolute to be considered in a
vacuum. It does not require complete identity for
every purpose and in every respect. In determining
equivalents, things equal to the same thing may not
be equal to each other and, by the same token,
things for most purposes different may sometimes be
equivalents. Consideration must be given to the
purpose for which an ingredient is used in a patent,
the qualities it has when combined with other
ingredients, and the function which it is intended to
perform. An important factor is whether persons
reasonably skilled in the art would have known of
the interchangeability of an ingredient not contained
in the patent with one that was.32

This holding is important because it is the current articulation of
the doctrine of equivalents.
Justice Black's dissent, however, charged that these arguments
did not justify sterilization of Acts of Congress.3 Justice Black
noted that Congress "entrusted the Patent Office, not the courts,
with initial authority to determine whether expansion of a claim
was justified."'
He also argued that "what is not specifically
claimed [in the patent] is dedicated to the public" and that giving
'0 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
a1 Id,

Ild1at 609.
" Id. at 613 (Black, J., dissenting).
lId. at 615.
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the "patentee the benefit of a grant that it did not precisely claim
is no less 'unjust to the public' and no less an evasion of [the
statute] merely because done in the name of the 'doctrine of equivalents.' " Finally, Justice Black identified a fundamental problem
in applying the doctrine of equivalents: the public cannot rely on
the language of a patent claim.'
The problems that both dissenting opinions highlight still exist
today. This Note's proposed solution would alleviate these
deficiencies. Furthermore, this proposed solution better considers
the equitable concerns that served as the underpinnings of both
majority opinions.
B. PRESENT STATUS OF THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS

Under the doctrine of equivalents, "infringement may be found
if an accused device performs substantially the same function in
substantially the same way to achieve substantially the same
result."3 7 This three prong test, the "function/way/result" test, is
deceptively simple. A product or process does not infringe, though
satisfying this analytically fluid test, if two additional requirements
are not met: (1) prosecution history estoppel, and (2) the prior art
limitation.'
Prosecution history estoppel, also known as "file wrapper
estoppel," prohibits the patentee from recapturing through
equivalents certain coverage given up during the patent prosecution." The scope of the equivalents, in other words, is limited
where the patentee restricted his original claims during prosecution
to obtain his patent. The court-determined equivalents, therefore,
cannot encompass claims that are inconsistent with the PTO's
restrictions in granting the patent.

' Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods., 339 U.S. 605, 614 (1950) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
Isd. at 617.
London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
"Penwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en
banc), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988).
'mLoctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861,870 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Patent prosecution
is the conduct of proceedings for granting and issuing patents. RONALD B. HILDRETH,
PATENT LAW A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 13 (1988).
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The prior art limitation prevents equivalents from extending to
an infringing device within the public domain, i.e., found in the
prior art at the time the patent is issued.' The CAFC developed
a method of analyzing the prior art limitation designed to aid the
trier of fact which uses hypothetical patent claims. In Wilson
Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Associates,41 the court
stated:
Whether prior art restricts the range of equivalents of what is literally claimed can be a difficult
question to answer. To simplify analysis and bring
the issue onto familiar turf, it may be helpful to
conceptualize the limitation on the scope of equivalents by visualizing a hypothetical patent claim,
sufficient in scope to literally cover the accused
product. The pertinent question then becomes
whether that hypothetical claim could have been
allowed by the PTO over the prior art. If not, then
it would be improper to permit the patentee to obtain
that coverage in an infringement suit under the
doctrine of equivalents. If the hypothetical claim
could have been allowed, then prior art is not a bar
to infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.42
Commentators, however, have been critical of this method.'
The doctrine of equivalents in its present form uses a mechanical,
instead of an equitable, approach. This mechanical application
ignores the fairness considerations that the Supreme Court
embraced in its decisions applying the doctrine of equivalents.

Loctite, 781 F.2d at 870.
904 F.2d 677 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
42 I& at 684.
" See, e.g., Parker, supra note 16, at 264 (noting that the CAFC "has explicitly dictated
an entirely new, and potentially exceedingly complex, test for determining whether or not
a patent is infringed under the Doctrine of Equivalents'); see also infra notes 81-88 and
accompanying text (discussing this criticism in relation to this Note's proposal).
40
41
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C. CURRENT REISSUE STATUTE

The patent statute contains a limited reissue procedure that
functions as a correction provision. This procedure allows enlargement of patent claims within two years of the granting of the
original patent." Narrowing claims, in contrast, is not subject to
the two-year limitation. 5 The PTO grants reissue claims only for
errors that occur without deceptive intent." Furthermore, the
application for reissue cannot introduce any new matter.47
The current patent statute also contains a provision establishing
reissue rights for the public and the patentee." When the PTO

35 U.S.C. § 251 (1988) which reads in part:
Whenever any patent is, through error without any deceptive
intention, deemed wholly or partially inoperative or invalid, by reason of
a defective specification or drawing, or by reason of the patentee claiming
more or less than he had a right to claim in the patent, the Commissioner shall, on the surrender of such patent and the payment of the fee
required by law, reissue the patent for the invention disclosed in the
original patent, and in accordance with a new and amended application,
for the unexpired part of the term of the original patent. No new matter
shall be introduced into the application for reissue ....
...No reissued patent shall be granted enlarging the scope of the
claims of the original patent unless applied for within two years from the
granting of the original patent.
,Wayne-Gossard Corp. v. Moretz Hosiery Mills, 384 F. Supp. 63, 71 (W.D.N.C. 1974)
(finding claims for reissue patent not invalid for failure to file application within two years
after grant of original patent where scope of the reissue claims was narrower).
"35 U.S.C. § 251 (1988). Deceptive intent is intent to mislead the PTO. Eg., Philip
Morris, Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 641 F. Supp. 1438, 1450 (M.D. Ga. 1986).
4 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1988). Matter not disclosed in the original patent is new matter.
Ballow v. Watson, 290 F.2d 353, 355 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
U.S.C. § 252 (1988) which reads in full:
435
The surrender of the original patent shall take effect upon the issue of
the reissued patent, and every reissued patent shall have the same effect
and operation in law, on the trial of actions for causes thereafter arising,
as if the same had been originally granted in such amended form, but in
so far as the claims of the original and reissued patents are identical,
such surrender shall not affect any action then pending nor abate any
cause of action then existing, and the reissued patent, to the extent that
its claims are identical with the original patent, shall constitute a
continuation thereof and have effect continuously from the date of the

original patent.
No reissue patent shall abridge or affect the right of any person or his
successors in business who made, purchased or used prior to the grant
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grants the reissue, the patentee surrenders the original patent in
return for the new patent except "to the extent that its claims are
identical with the original patent."'
The unaltered claims
constitute a continuation of the original patent with no variation in
the patentee's rights.'
The current reissue procedure limits a patentee's rights for the
reissue claims through two separate considerations, known as
intervening rights.51 First, prior to the PTO granting the reissue,
the patentee has no rights against another party whose product
does not literally infringe an original claim but does infringe the
reissue claim. 2 The statute grants the alleged infringer an
absolute right to continue to use or sell the specific thing made,
purchased, or used prior to the reissue.5 Second, if the purchase,
practice, use, or substantial preparation was made before the grant
of the reissue, the court may allow the continued manufacture, use,
or sale of the now-patented item and the continued use of any
process." In granting this continuation, the court considers these
enumerated factors "to the extent and under such terms as [it]
deems equitable for the protection of investments made or business
commenced before the grant of the reissue. " '

of a reissue anything patented by the reissue patent, to continue the use
of, or to sell to others to be used or sold, the specific thing so made,
purchased or used, unless the making, using or selling of such thing
infringes a valid claim of the reissued patent which was in the original

patent. The court before which such matter is in question may provide
for the continued manufacture, use or sale of the thing made, purchased
or used as specified, or for the manufacture, use or sale of which

49 Id

substantial preparation was made before the grant of reissue, and it may
also provide for the continued practice of any process patented by the
reissue, practiced, or for the reissue, to the extent and under such terms
as the court deems equitable for the protection of the investments made
or business commenced before the grant of the reissue.

5 Id.
"'E.g., Sontag Chain Stores Co. v. National Nut Co. of Cal., 310 U.S. 281, 295 (1940);
Cohen v. United States, 487 F.2d 525, 528 (C.C.PA. 1973).
35 U.S.C. § 252 (1988).
uId
Id. Process is defined as a method of treating material to produce a particular result

or product. A process can also relate to a new use of a known composition, apparatus, or the
like. HILDRETH, supra note 39, at 5.
5 35 U.S.C. § 252 (1988).
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These intervening rights may be avoided, in theory, by drafting
claims more broadly or narrowly in the initial application. If the
patentee desires to make these changes after the patent has issued,
intervening rights arise to protect the public. If the patentee relies
on the doctrine of equivalents to find infringement instead of this
reissue statute, then the court does not consider intervening rights
and the public loses this congressionally mandated protection.
D. INHERENT PROBLEMS WITH THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS

The doctrine of equivalents must meet both the demands of the
Constitution in the Intellectual Property Clause and congressional
directives. The doctrine of equivalents, however, fails to fully
implement either of these criteria.
1. Constitutional Shortcomings. The doctrine of equivalents
began as a tool of equity, an alternative of last resort." Today,
however, the doctrine of equivalents routinely functions as a
secondary infringement test, an issue of fact to be resolved in
virtually every patent suit. 7 Thus, in most infringement suits,
equivalency is an issue that the trier of fact must resolve." Such
prolific use of the doctrine of equivalents inhibits the patent system
from fulfilling its constitutional purpose: the promotion of progress
in the useful arts.
Infringement by the doctrine of equivalents fundamentally
conflicts with the policy that patent claims define and measure the
scope of a patent."' The public has no method to design around
claims because there are no clear bounds. The patent system is
premised, in part, upon public reliance on the claim language. The
CAFC has stated that "[d]esigning around patents is, in fact, one
of the ways in which the patent system works to the advantage of
the public in promoting progress in the useful arts, its constitution-

7

Collins, supra note 16, at 288.

d.; Adelman & Francione, supra note 16, at 699.

58 Despite this routine application, the CAFC maintains that the doctrine of equivalents

is the exception, not the rule, for infringement cases. London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co.,
946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991). A conflict thus exists between the anticipated use of
the doctrine of equivalents and actual practice.
Fairfax Dental Ltd. v. Sterling Optical Corp., 808 F. Supp. 326,335-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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al purpose."6 In another case, the CAFC noted that the public
may come to believe that they can never rely upon the patent
language because protection will be extended beyond the scope of
the claims.6 ' The court also noted that the result of routine use
of the doctrine of equivalents will cause patent claims to cease
serving their intended purpose because competitors will never know
whether their actions infringe a patent.6 2
The doctrine of equivalents thus undermines a constitutional
purpose of the patent system. Since use of the doctrine of equivalents provides no definite limits and its use has become widespread,
the current system hinders the public's ability to design around
patents, a fundamental purpose of the Intellectual Property
Clause.'
2. Circumventing Congress. The co-existence of the current
reissue procedure and the doctrine of equivalents is unsatisfactory
because the doctrine of equivalents circumvents a congressional
directive. Within the two-year statutory period, a patentee may
attempt to expand his patent to encompass another's product or
process using either a reissue patent or the doctrine of equivalents.
The patentee's use of the congressionally created reissue procedure
invokes intervening rights pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 252. In
contrast, the patentee who relies solely upon the judicially created
doctrine of equivalents affords the public no protection as Congress
mandated in establishing these intervening rights. The doctrine of
equivalents therefore circumvents Congress's statutory requirements. This practice is unjustifiable because courts lack the power
to implicitly negate statutes.
II. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION

Congress should expand the reissue procedure to encompass the
life of the patent. Such expansion would resolve the continuing
problems with the application of the doctrine of equivalents. Con' Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (emphasis
added).
London, 946 F.2d at 1538.
aId.
Contra Id. ('This equitable doctrine evolved from a balancing of competing policies,
each of which supports the Constitutional purpose of promoting the 'useful arts.' ").
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gress should also abolish any distinction between types of reissues
and instead give the patentee freedom to broaden or narrow his
claims." Once Congress expands the reissue procedure, it should
make two modifications to the current reissue procedure: (1) an
allowance for new technology developments, and (2) a modification
of the intervening rights provision.
Congress should amend the present statute to allow a reissue for
new technology developments.' This proposed technology development provision differs from new matter."
To qualify, the
applicable technology would need to be unavailable during the
original prosecution, to be applicable to the granted claims, and to
supplement the claims instead of changing their nature. 7 This
provision would require the patentee to be more proactive than
under the present system because the patentee would be forced to
consider potential new technology developments that could affect
his patent. The patentee thus would be more cognizant to the
possibility of obtaining a reissue patent, and his reissue patent
would result in broader public knowledge. This provision consequently would better promote the useful arts, a constitutional
purpose of the patent system.

35 U.S.C. § 251 explicitly addresses the two-year time limitation to grant a reissue
patent if it enlarges the scope of the claims of the original patent. The statute, however,
does not address narrowing the scope of claims. See Wayne-Gossard Corp. v. Moretz Hosiery
Mills, 384 F. Supp. 63, 71 (W.D.N.C. 1974) (finding claims for reissue patent not invalid for
failure to file application within two years after grant of original patent where scope of the
reissue claims was narrower).
" Cf Adelman & Francione, supra note 16, at 728 (arguing that sole legitimate function
of doctrine of equivalents should be limited to covering technology literally unavailable
during prosecution).
" New matter is new substantive disclosure which would have the effect of changing the
invention or of introducing what might be the subject of another patent application. Siebert
Cylinder Oil Corp. v. Harper Steam Lubricator Co., 4 F. 328, 333 (C.C.D. Conn. 1880). A
new technology development, in comparison, is matter that is covered by the present patent
wherein technological developments have improved or transformed the matter.
'" Similar to the doctrine of equivalents, if the "total of the technological changes [are]
beyond what the patentee disclosed" in the specification, a reissue would be inappropriate.
Texas Instruments v. United States Intl Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558, 1571 (Fed. Cir.
1986). Under the doctrine of equivalents, i]t is the entirety of the technology embodied in
the accused devices that must be compared with the patent disclosure. Any other view
distorts both the correct interpretation of the claims and their application to the accused
devices." Id. at 1570 (citations omitted).
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Also, under the proposed system, Congress should modify
intervening rights. These intervening rights would be based upon
the filing date of the reissue, not upon the grant date." The
patentee's right to sue for infringement, in comparison, would begin
when the PTO grants the reissue."
If the infringing party acted prior to the patentee filing a reissue
application, intervening rights would exist pursuant to the current
reissue procedure.7 Parties who use a process or product after
the reissue filing date, however, would not receive the benefit of
intervening rights. The need for confidentiality in the reissue
process is not required since the reissue patent would only correct
errors or allow modifications for new technological developments.
Hence, the reissue application could be filed with the patent to give
the public notice. Parties then could risk using the filed, but not
granted, reissue patent. These parties, in effect, would gamble on
whether the PTO will disapprove the reissue, thus eliminating
liability, or whether the PTO will grant it, thus creating liability for
infringement.
This proposal provides an opportunity for the parties to "design
around" both the patent and the reissue application, further
supporting the constitutional directive of promoting the useful arts.
This proposal also allows the patentee to circumvent intervening
rights if he files a reissue patent before another party uses a
product or process that the reissue claims encompass. This
proposal thus alleviates a constitutional shortcoming of the doctrine
of equivalents.
Concurrent with these statutory changes, the doctrine of
equivalents should be abolished.

68 One commentator who considered the reissue as an alternative to the doctrine of
equivalents noted that the filing date, instead of the grant date, should determine
intervening rights since the reissue proceedings may take two or more years and thus
prejudice the patentee's rights. Wegner, supra note 16, at 35.
Using the filing date appears, in theory, more just; pragmatically, this would create
many new problems. How does one enforce the prospective approval of a reissue? On what
basis may a court issue an injunction? What happens if a patentee bars an alleged, nonliteral infringer from using the prospective reissue, and the PTO subsequently rejects the
reissue?
70 35 U.S.C. § 252 (1988).
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III. ADVANTAGES OF THE PROPOSED REISSUE PROCEDURE
An expanded reissue procedure provides numerous benefits over
the doctrine of equivalents. Specifically, the expanded reissue
procedure offers the following advantages: improving decision
consistency, eliminating procedural difficulties and confusion in the
courts, providing the inventor with an equal scope of patent
equivalents, better resolving the fundamental tension with the
purpose of the doctrine of equivalents, and better satisfying the
policy considerations of the doctrine of equivalents.
A. BENEFITS OF THE PTO'S EXPERIENCE AND KNOWLEDGE

The PTO's experience and knowledge provide many advantages
over a court in deciding patent equivalents. The PTO better
understands patent law and technology and thus would provide
greater certainty in determining patent equivalents.
The jury in a patent infringement case faces a broad scope of
inventions dealing with complex topics, ranging from electrical
engineering, to complex polymer production, to a variety of nascent
technologies. Even without considering these complicated sciences,
juries have increasingly been criticized as being ill-equipped to
decide adequately the basic issues in the cases before them. 1
These criticisms are spurred in part by the educational background
of some juries.7 2 In contrast, under an expanded reissue procedure, the PTO would decide these complex issues. PTO examiners
are specialists. They concentrate only on particular fields, and in
many technologies, further specialize within a given branch. In
some cases, the reissue examiner may be the same examiner who
originally granted the patent. Compared to a jury, the PTO
examiners better understand the complex technologies.
In addition, the expanded reissue procedure would make
decisions concerning patent equivalents more logical and predict"1See generally Steven I. Friedland, The Competency and Responsibilitiesof Jurors in
Deciding Cases, 85 NW. U. L. REv. 190 (1990).
" In one complex case involving antitrust and patent violations, the jury's average
education was at the tenth grade level. Douglas W. Ell, Note, The Right to an Incompetent
Jury: ProtractedCommercialLitigationand the Seventh Amendment, 10 CONN. L. REV. 775,
776 (1978) (discussing SCM Corp. v. Xerox, 463 F. Supp. 983 (D. Conn. 1978)).
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able, creating greater certainty. 73 The PTO's greater technical
expertise would provide sound and consistent decisions. Improved
consistency is inherent since the PTO is a small administrative
body with daily tasks revolving around patents. Federal courts, on
the other hand, consider patent claims infrequently. 7 Federal
judges, although possessing astute legal minds, may lack the
scientific background to decide equivalency issues as effectively as
the PTO. Some federal judges may have a scientific background
different from the subject of the doctrine of equivalents before
them. The PTO examiners, in contrast, specialize in these
technologies. Hearings before the PTO thus would provide a better
forum to determine the scope of equivalents as compared to a bench
trial because it is unlikely that a federal judge will decide an
equivalency issue in a particular area in which he or she has a
technical expertise. 5
B. ELIMINATING PROCEDURAL DIFFICULTIES

The courts' lesser knowledge in the technical fields is matched by
procedural difficulties. The court must define the scope of equivalents for a patent, a difficult task; it requires an understanding of
the technology in the patent at issue, the accused device, and the
prior art-all of which affect the scope of equivalents. Prosecution
history estoppel also varies the range of equivalents. The CAFC
has further complicated the courts' task with its hypothetical claim
method.
Under the doctrine of equivalents, the court must "review the
" This proposal may be further developed. The PTO could resolve disputes between the
parties-the one seeking the reissue and the one allegedly infringing. The PTO presently

functions as a dispute resolution body. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 1.291-97 (1992) (protests and
public use proceedings); 37 C.F.R. § 1.601-90 (1992) (interferences).
' In one case, the CAFC stated that "unlike a jury in a district court case, the [U.S.
International Trade Commission] resolves disputes involving patent infringement matters
with some regularity and thus is aware of doctrine of equivalents jurisprudence." Intel Corp.
v. United States Intl Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821, 832-33 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (emphasis added).
The PTO, based upon its function, is more aware of legal issues concerning patents than the

U.S. International Trade Commission. A fortiori, the PTO is more capable than a jury of
understanding legal issues involving patent equivalents.

" Judges, in the applicable infringement situations under the expanded reissue
procedure, would still decide questions ofequity and damages, areas in which they are highly
qualified and experienced.
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content of the patent, the prior art, and the accused device, and
essentially redefin[e] the scope of the claims."7" The court conducting the analysis first decides whether the patent qualifies as
either a pioneer invention or an improvement. 77 This determination sets the scope of equivalents available for a patent. In
addition, prior art and prosecution history estoppel vary the range
of equivalents.7" Furthermore, the scope of equivalents may turn
on "the totality of change in the accused devices from that described
in the [claim] specification."79
Considering prosecution history estoppel specifically, the PTO
possesses greater knowledge and experience concerning claim
breadth limitations. For instance, the PTO understands why it
previously required the surrender of a particular claim or removal
of certain language. A trial court, however, is inexperienced at
such practice and may not fully understand the reasons for these
amendments to the original claims.s* A court's unfamiliarity with
these issues could possibly skew its decisions.
Considering the prior art limitation, the CAFC established a
method using hypothetical patent claims to verify the breadth of
the equivalents. The CAFC's method set the same bounds as the
PTO would have set in that situation. The Wilson Sporting Goods
court ruled that "the pertinent question [for the court] then
becomes whether that hypothetical claim could have been allowed

76

Texas Instruments v. United States Intl Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558, 1572 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
" See, e.g., Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(noting that invention in crowded field is entitled only to narrow scope of equivalents);
Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("A
pioneer invention is entitled to a broad range of equivalents.").
78
Texas Instruments, 805 F.2d at 1572 ("While the prior art and prosecution history are
necessary considerations in applying the doctrine of equivalents, they do not of themselves
control the breadth of equivalents available under the doctrine.*); see supra notes 39-40 and
accompanying text (discussing how prior art and prosecution history estoppel affect scope of
equivalents).
Texas Instruments, 805 F.2d at 1572.
The CAFC highlighted the complexity of prosecution history estoppel interpretation,
noting that "amendments may be of different types and may serve different functions.
Depending on the nature and purpose of an amendment it may have a limiting effect within
a spectrum ranging from great to small to zero." Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717
F.2d 1351, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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by the PTO over the prior art.""1 Thus, the applicable standard is
the PTO's likely determination. This ruling raises a rhetorical
question: Who is better qualified than the PTO itself to decide as
the PTO would in a given situation?
The Wilson Sporting Goods holding has made the courts' task
exceedingly complex.' First, confusion may result because "the
case to be presented by the patentee in support of the hypothetical
claims will be similar in many respects to the validity evidence to
be offered by it in rebuttal against an invalidity defense raised by
The next complication is the classic
the alleged infringer."'
patent law requirement that "a claim be interpreted in the same
manner for the purposes of both validity and infringement.""4 The
claims that a patentee would try to prove valid are different from
the claims that a defendant would try to prove invalid.' Further
complications may arise when "another, preliminary and subsidiary, validity analysis is introduced with respect to a second claim,
or set of claims. " The complicated situation may be exacerbated
if the suit involves a means-plus-function claim 7 where the fact
finder must contend with two types of "validity" analyses as well as
with two types of equivalency analyses." A jury must decide this
litigation mess. Unfortunately, this jury may have difficulty with
its basic tasks; i.e., it may not fully understand the applicable rules
and principles of law or the judge's instructions."9
These procedural difficulties are eliminated under the expanded
reissue procedure, thus potentially reducing litigation costs. Under
the expanded reissue procedure, the PTO would determine the
equivalents and then the fact finder in the subsequent trial would
determine whether literal infringement exists. If the process or
product infringed the reissue patent, a judge would decide the
remedy since the doctrine of intervening rights is equitable in
" Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (emphasis added).
82 Parker, supra note 16, at 264.
ad. at 274-75.
84
Id. at 275.
a
See infranotes 129-130 and accompanying text (discussing means-plus-function claim).
supra note 16, at 275-76.
"Parker,
89
Friedland, supra note 69, at 197.
87
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nature. If infringement of the reissue patent occurred after the
filing date, however, the court would award damages since
intervening rights would be irrelevant. The expanded reissue
procedure therefore drastically simplifies the present quagmire
existing under the doctrine of equivalents.
Another benefit of the expanded reissue procedure is the
increased likelihood of a summary judgment or an out-of-court
settlement because literal infringement would be the only cause of
action for patent infringement.' This translates into a savings of
time and resources for the parties and the court.
The financial aspect of a reissue procedure also strongly supports
adoption of the expanded procedure. Attorney's fees to prepare and
prosecute a patent application may total approximately $6000.91
These fees, however, may be lower for a reissue since it modifies
the original patent. In contrast, the average attorney's fees per
litigant to prepare and try a patent infringement case will soon
approach $1,000,000.
The benefits of the expanded reissue
procedure-uncomplicated litigation and an increased probability
of summary judgment-may result in enormous money savings.
Under the proposed reissue procedure, the PTO's involvement
would alleviate procedural difficulties that the courts presently
experience. As a result, infringement litigation would be less
complicated and less expensive.
C. REMOVING UNCERTAINTY IN THE COURTS

Confusion over the various infringement doctrines is another
problem that exists in the courts. Uncertainty results from
confusion between the doctrine of equivalents and either literal
infringement or a means-plus-function claim under 35 U.S.C. § 112.

" See, eg., Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950) ("A
finding of equivalence is a determination of fact.*); SRI Intl v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. ofAm.,
775 F.2d 1107, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) ("The doctrine of equivalents raises a fact
question....-).
91 William L. LaFuze, President's Page, Some Thoughts On Improving Our Domestic
Intellectual Property System, AIPLA BULLETIN, Dec. 1992, at 183 (citing AIPLA Report of
Economic Survey-1991, prepared by the AIPLA Committee on Economics of the Legal

Practice).
" I&
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Confusion often arises concerning the distinction between literal
infringement and the doctrine of equivalents. Some "[clourts have
appeared to find direct or literal infringement while in reality
applying the doctrine of equivalents. '
Conversely, "other courts
have found infringement under the doctrine of equivalents in cases
where there was literal infringement. '
Courts also use an "equivalency" analysis to find infringement in
both the doctrine of equivalents and a means-plus-function claim
of 35 U.S.C. § 112. Although both infringement theories use the
word "equivalents," the application is different under each theory; 9 a determination of section 112 equivalence, unlike the
doctrine of equivalents, does not currently use the equitable
tripartite function/way/result test." Furthermore, the doctrine of

" Steven J. Grossman, Experimental Use or FairUse as a Defense to PatentInfringement,
30 J.L. & TECH. 243, 244 (1990) (citing AIPLA FederalPractice and ProcedureCommittee,
Federal Circuit Patent Law Decisions, A Case by Case Review of the Federal Circuit's
RfootPrinciple Patent Decisions to See Whether the Court Has Unified Patent Law
Jurisprudence98 (KE. Krosin ed., 19S6) (citing Kalene Corp. v. Motor City Treating, Inc.,
440 F.2d 77 (6th Cir. 1971))).
" Id (citing AIPLA FederalPractice and Procedure Committee, Federal CircuitPatent
Law Decisions,A Case by CaseReview of the FederalCircuit'sRfootPrinciplePatentDecisions
to See Whether the CourtHas Unified Patent Law Jurisprudence98 (KE. Krosin ed., 1986)
(citing Farmhand, Inc. v. Craven, 455 F.2d 609 (Sth Cir. 1972))).
The CAFC stated the test for the means-plus.function limitation to read on an accused
device in Valmont Industries v. Reinke Manufacturing Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 1042 (Fed. Cir.
1993):
[T]he accused device must employ means identical to or the equivalent
of the structures, material, or acts described in the patent specification.
The accused device must also perform the identical function as specified
in the claims.
In 1986, however, the CAFC held:
Whether the issue is equivalency of a means that is described in the
specification to perform a function in a "means" clause of a combination
claim (i.e., literal infringement), or equivalency to the claimed invention
as a whole (i.e., infringement by the doctrine of equivalents), the test is
the same three part test of history: does the asserted equivalent perform
substantially the same function in substantially the same way to
accomplish substantially the same result. (In the case of "means"
clauses, of course, the function is that stated in the claim.)
Texas Instruments v. United States Intl Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558, 1571 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (emphasis added).
96Valmont Industries, 983 F.2d at 1043.
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equivalents and section 112 have different origins and purposes. 7
A district court recently confused these two infringement theories
and was subsequently reversed by the CAFC. 9
Congressional approval of the expanded reissue procedure would
eliminate these problems. First, courts would be unable to confuse
literal infringement and infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents. The courts would only consider literal infringement,
which includes the subcategory of means-plus-function infringement. Second, only one type of "equivalents" would exist, thus
removing another source of confusion. Eliminating the source of
these past mistakes would benefit the affected parties and the
judicial system.
D. THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS AND THE PROPOSED REISSUE
EXPANSION PROVIDE AN EQUAL SCOPE OF COVERAGE TO THE PATEN-

TEE

Replacing the doctrine of equivalents with an expanded reissue
procedure would not cause the patentee to lose any claim protection. The allowable scope of patent claims would be the same for
both methods of determining equivalents because they use
analogous rules: prior art limitations, prosecution history estoppel,
limitations on new matter, and provisions for advances in technology.
The doctrine of equivalents and the expanded reissue procedure
both limit the scope of patents where it would encroach on a
product or process in the prior art. Likewise, these methods bar
the scope of the patentee's claims from including certain coverage
given up during the prosection of the patent. This limitation is
known as prosection history estoppel in the doctrine of equivalents.
Under the reissue procedure, coverage is limited to "error without
any deceptive intention." This limitation prevents the patentee
from changing claims to recapture subject matter that was
intentionally surrendered during the prosecution of the original
"Id. at 1043-44 (Section 112, 1 6, limits the broad language of means-plus-function
limitations in combination claims to equivalents of the structures, materials, or acts in the
specification. The doctrine of equivalents equitably expands exclusive patent rights.").

I& at 1044.
35 U.S.C. 1 251 (1988).
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patent.1°° This concept, known as the "recapture rule" for a
reissue, is the same as prosecution history estoppel.
Another limitation to the scope of equivalents is that the original
patent must have intended to encompass the requested claims. 10 1
The reissue statute specifically requires that "no new matter shall
be introduced into the application for reissue." 1 2 Likewise, the
doctrine of equivalents does not provide coverage which the
patentee could not have lawfully obtained from the PTO during
patent prosecution. 103
Although different from new matter, technological developments
similarly affect the scope of patent equivalents. The doctrine of
equivalents permits advances in technology. 1"' Likewise, this
proposal also permits the patentee to obtain a reissue for new
technology affecting his claims.
These two methods, the doctrine of equivalents and the expanded
reissue procedure, thus give the patentee an equal scope of
protection. The expanded reissue procedure therefore will not
diminish the patentee's coverage. Unlike the doctrine of equivalents, however, the reissue remains in force for the life of the
patent and is available against all future infringers. Thus, the
expanded reissue procedure provides equal coverage for the
patentee, yet avoids the problems of the doctrine of equivalents.
E. THE EXPANDED REISSUE PROCEDURE BETTER RECONCILES THE
FUNDAMENTAL TENSION RESULTING FROM THE COMPETING OBJEC-

TIVES OF THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS

The doctrine of equivalents has two competing objectives which
cause an inherent tension: (1) to permit "designing around" the
patent by giving the public fair notice of the claimed invention, and

10

Curtis B. Hamre et al., Reissue and Reexamination, 29 J.L. & TECH 311, 312 (1989).
E.g., In re Weiler, 790 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
'0' 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1988).
1
'" Eg., Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684 (Fed.
Cir. 1990).
1
o'See Atlas Power Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1581 (Fed. Cir.
1984) ('[D]evices changing the patented invention with advances developed subsequent to
the patent could infringe under the doctrine of equivalents.*).
11

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol1/iss1/10

22

Altera: Expanding the Reissue Procedure: A Better Way to Do Business

1993]

EXPANDED REISSUE PROCEDURE

207

(2) to protect fully the patentee's invention. 1°5 Since these are
opposing goals, they cannot be reconciled and no solution completely satisfies both objectives. The question, however, is one of
balance. Emphasis must be placed on the constitutional requirement to promote the useful arts.
An expanded reissue procedure offers the better solution to this
inherent tension. The expanded reissue procedure would shift more
importance to giving the public fair notice and would allow the
public to rely on and design around the claims, thus promoting the
useful arts." This emphasis on the constitutional requirement
to promote the useful arts would give the patentee less, yet
adequate, protection compared to that provided by the doctrine of
equivalents.'

7

The expanded reissue procedure appropriately places the
responsibility of using proper claim language on the patentee. The
patentee controls his fate by choosing the claim language. Under
the expanded reissue procedure, the patentee may correct mistakes
in claim drafting. No similar protection of the public exists under
the doctrine of equivalents. Today's competitors and businesses are
subject to an uncertain range of liability, yet they cannot rely on
the claim language and lack an analytical framework to determine
the scope of the claims. Unfortunately, as the law stands today,
the public's only options entail costly litigation to defend non-literal
infringement or total restraint from using the product or process.
It is only fair to hold the patentee responsible for his chosen claim
language, as the expanded reissue procedure requires. A patent
system using the doctrine of equivalents wherein the public cannot
rely on the claim language is unfair and fails to satisfy its constitutional mandate.
The expanded reissue procedure would better satisfy the
Intellectual Property Clause by allowing the public to design
around patents, thus encouraging progress in the useful arts.
Furthermore, under the proposal, the patentee must be cognizant
1

" Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand.Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 945 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc)
(Bennett,
J., dissenting in part), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988).
106
Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
107

See Pennwalt,833 F.2d at 945 (Bennett, J., dissenting in part) ("[Elqually important

to the statutory purpose of encouraging progress in the useful arts, is the policy of affording
the patent owner complete and fair protection of what was invented.").
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of new technology relevant to his invention; this further promotes
the constitutional purpose of the patent system by increasing public
knowledge through the patentee's resulting claims in his reissue
patent.
F.
THE PROPOSED REISSUE EXPANSION SATISFIES THE POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS

An expanded reissue procedure would meet the Supreme Court's
goals in approving the doctrine of equivalents. The expanded
reissue procedure protects against a copyist, protects the inventor,
and prevents fraud on a patent.
In Graver Tank, the Supreme Court recognized that
to permit imitation of a patented invention which
does not copy every literal detail would be to convert
the protection of the patent into a hollow and useless
thing. Such a limitation would leave room for-indeed encourage-the unscrupulous copyist to make
unimportant and insubstantial changes and substitutions in the patent which, though adding nothing,
would be enough to take the copied matter outside
the claim, and hence outside the reach of law.o8
The expanded reissue procedure would satisfy the goal of protecting
the patentee from the "unscrupulous copyist." This is true even
though the patentee may not have the same scope of coverage
against infringement by the copyist. 1 After the PTO grants the
reissue and literal infringement exists under the reissue claims, a
court applying its equity balancing pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 252 will
not allow the "unscrupulous copyist" to continue manufacturing and
selling the product or process. This remedy will discourage a
copyist in the same way potential liability discourages a copyist
under the doctrine of equivalents.
The GraverTank Court also noted a second concern: without the
'

Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).

Infringement may not exist until the reissued patent is granted, and then intervening
rights may arise.
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doctrine of equivalents, the inventor would be "at the mercy of
verbalism," "subordinating substance to form," and "[deprived] of
the benefit[s] of his invention, foster[ing] concealment rather than
disclosure of inventions.1 1
The reissue procedure solves this
problem of subordinating substance to form by allowing the
patentee to expand the claim language in a reissue. Moreover, the
patentee in this ex parte process would be responsible for his
chosen claim language. Thus, the goal of protecting the inventor
is met without the paternalism evidenced in other areas of the law,
such as analogous contract and property law."'
The Graver Tank Court enunciated a final goal: one may not
practice fraud on a patent. 1 2 Filing a reissue will alleviate fraud
by allowing the patentee to correct mistakes in claim drafting." 3
The expanded reissue procedure, similar to the doctrine of equivalents, thus meets this goal.
IV. PATENTEE CONCERNS WITH THE PROPOSED SOLUTION

Under the proposed expansion of the reissue procedure, the
patentee may have two concerns: intervening rights and burden of
proof considerations. Neither of these concerns, however, undermine the validity of this proposal. The expanded reissue proposal
offers an appropriate level of protection for both the public and the
patentee.
A. INTERVENING RIGHTS

The possible existence of intervening rights is, from the patentee's perspective, a drawback of the expanded reissue procedure.
110

d,
...
See infra notes 112-115 and accompanying text (discussing contract and property
analysis compared to doctrine of equivalents).
"2 GraverTank, 339 U.S. at 608. Fraud on a patent occurs when an infringer steals the
benefits of an invention.
" From the patentee's perspective, however, the potential intervening rights create an
imperfection. Nevertheless, the balance between complete protection of the patentee and the
public's ability to rely on the language of the patent must be set. A preference should exist
for the expanded reissue procedure for many reasons including the problems with the
doctrine of equivalents, the constitutional mandate to promote the useful arts, and the
permanency of the reissue procedure.
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Under the proposed system, however, this drawback is mitigated
because filing for a reissue would bar subsequent infringers from
obtaining any benefits from intervening rights. Intervening rights,
however, would arise only when the alleged non-literal infringer
acts before the reissue filing date. The party using the invention
is not potentially liable until the grant date of the reissue. After
the PTO grants the reissue, the now-infringing party could continue
to use or to market the product as the court deems equitable.
These modified intervening rights are acceptable and fair. The
patentee, as opposed to the public and the courts, should be
responsible for using the proper claim language. Thus, if the
claims are too restrictive, the patentee should be responsible,
rather than the party relying on the patent language.
Analogous legal arguments support the proposition that the
patentee should be responsible for his claim language. For
example, if a business owner decides a contract is more restrictive
than desired, the courts will not expand its scope to cover what was
excluded during its drafting. 114 The same principle should apply
to a patent claim."' Similarly, if a real property owner divides
an estate but incorrectly records the "metes and bounds," the courts
will not broaden the limits of one sub-estate at the expense of
another.1 16 Instead, non-judicial changes are required. Alteration of the "metes and bounds" of a patent should also require a
non-judicial procedure. In contrast, the doctrine of equivalents
provides more leniency than analogous contract and property law.
This increased tolerance exists because the claim boundaries are
not rigidly set. Specifically, the doctrine of equivalents "expands
the right to exclude to 'equivalents' of what is claimed." 7 Based
upon these analogous legal arguments, the leniency that courts use
under the doctrine of equivalents is unwarranted.

114 See 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 373 (1963) ("[T]he law does not countenance a change in

the contractual status which would result in unfair advantage to one and impose undue
burden on the other.").
1
The expanded reissue procedure would mitigate problems created by subsequent
improvements in the arts by explicitly including a provision for new technological
developments.
"6 See generally 3A C.J.S. Alteration of Instruments § 51 (1973).
...
Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684 (Fed. Cir.

1990) (emphasis omitted).
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The expanded reissue procedure would use the same standard for
a plaintiff to prevail as in other civil actions. Under the doctrine
of equivalents, the standard for the plaintiff to prevail at trial may
be lower than in other civil matters. This latitude is misplaced, not
only considering these analogous legal theories, but also because a
patentee during prosecution is operating in an ex parte proceeding.
Under the expanded reissue procedure, the courts would strictly
and literally interpret the patent claim language. The inventors
and their agents thus would be held to a higher, though not
unreasonable, standard. The patentee may remedy the improperly
written claims by filing a reissue. And, if a patentee files a reissue
before another party uses the product or process, corrections may
be implemented without the consequences of intervening rights.
The patentee has an additional weapon to protect his invention:
use of a "means-plus-function" claim. 1 8 This statute permits the
patentee to use broad functional language in the claims to explain
the invention. 119 The patentee, without using the reissue procedure, may file an infringement action against any party producing
or selling his invention with insubstantial changes and substitutions, thus evading any intervening rights.12
Based upon analogous legal arguments and the standards used
in other civil matters, the use of modified intervening rights would
be fair and proper under the proposed reissue procedure.
B. BURDEN OF PROOF CONSIDERATIONS

Present law places the burden of proving infringement on the

35 U.S.C. § 112, 1 6 (1988) provides:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means
or step for performing a specified function without the recital of
structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be
construed to cover the corresponding structure material, or acts described
in the specification and equivalents thereof.
119Id.
'o In some instances, however, the means-plus-function claims may not be useful, such
as in unpredictable arts. See Adelman & Francione, supra note 16, at 714 n.176, 722 n.213
(discussing need for greater disclosure to support broad claim when technology is
unpredictable, such as in chemical reactions or in other art with unpredictable, rather than
predictable, factors).
118
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patentee121 while the defendant bears the burden of proof for the
This affirmative
affirmative defense of patent invalidity.'2
defense requires proof by clear and convincing evidence" 2 because
all patent claims by statute are entitled to a presumption of validity." The defendant also bears the burden of proof for affirmative defenses concerning the doctrine of equivalents, such as
prosecution history estoppel and claim invalidity.' 25 These
affirmative defenses must satisfy a preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard.1
Under an expanded reissue procedure, the patentee would still
carry the burden to prove literal infringement of the reissued
patent. The accused infringer would likewise bear the burden to
prove patent invalidity by clear and convincing evidence. Since the
doctrine of equivalents would not apply, the patentee would no
longer address the scope of equivalents. The defendant, correspondingly, would not use affirmative defenses specific to the
doctrine of equivalents, such as prosecution history estoppel.
Instead, the patentee, in effect, would prove the "equivalents" to the
PTO. The patentee thus would still prove the same claims, but to
the PTO instead of to a court as he would under the doctrine of
equivalents.'2 7
The PTO must meet a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard to
reject the patentee's reissue. 2' Likewise, the doctrine of equivalents requires that the defendant, in order to reject the plaintiffs
equivalents, must satisfy a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.

.1 E.g., Under Sea Indus. v. Dacor Corp., 833 F.2d 1551, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
'" E.g., Alco Standard Corp. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 808 F.2d 1490, 1498 (Fed. Cir.

1986), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987).
Eg., Jones v. Hardy, 727 F.2d 1524, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1528; 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1988).
E.g., Carman Indus. v. Wahl, 724 F.2d 932, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
Id. at 942 n.28; JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE HANDBOOK § 9.2, at

441 n.5; see generally 60 AM. JUR. 2D Patent § 1072 (1987).
L See Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 685 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (placing burden on plaintiff to prove hypothetical claims because "any other

approach would ignore the realities of what happens in the PTO and violate established
patent law").
'In re Caveny, 761 F.2d 671, 674 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ([T]he standard of proof required to
properly reject the claims of a patent application is necessarily lower than that required to
invalidate patent claims .... [P]reponderence of the evidence is the standard that must be
met by the PTO in making rejections .... ').
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Arguments may arise that the accused infringer may lose judicial
protection in comparison to the doctrine of equivalents, but this
criticism is inappropriate. First, the standards are not exactly
equivalent. 129 The patentee wins against the PTO and loses
against the defendant when the evidence for the patentee is exactly
equal to the opposing evidence. Determining when the evidence
satisfies the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard is somewhat
arbitrary; thus, a small variation in judicial line drawing creates
questionable concerns. This questionable concern is further
mitigated since an expanded reissue procedure would permit the
PTO to develop knowledgeable, consistent standards in establishing
this preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. Conversely, under
the current doctrine of equivalents, the standards could vary from
court to court, further discouraging a competitor from attempting
to design around the patented device.
Second, opponents of this proposal may also argue that the PTO
would use less resources than a defendant trying to reject the
patentee's "equivalent," thus undermining the patentee's protection.
A reexamination procedure's" mitigates this concern and protects
the public. The accused infringer may request the reexamination,13' and the PTO will approve the request if a "substantial

_
The prosecution's burden may be lower than the preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard. When the burden is on the PTO, then a situation where the evidence is evenly
balanced would lead to the granting of a patent. See Parker, supra note 16, at 281 n.72. In
comparison, the defendant would prevail if an evenly balanced situation exists in a civil trial.
See generally SSIH Equipment S.A. v. United States Intl Trade Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365, 380

(Fed. Cir. 1983) (Nies, J., additional views) ('It suffices for present purposes simply to recall
that in American law a preponderance of the evidence is rock bottom at the fact-finding level
of civil litigation.").

35 U.S.C. § 132 (1988) allows a reexamination:
Whenever, on examination, any claim for a patent is rejected, or any
objection or requirement made, the Commissioner shall notify the
applicant thereof, stating the reasons for such rejection, or objection or
requirement, together with such information and references as may be

useful in judging of the propriety of continuing the prosecution of his
application; and if after receiving such notice, the applicant persists in

his claim for a patent, with or without amendment, the application shall
be reexamined. No amendment shall introduce new matter into the
disclosure of the invention.

3' 37 C.F.I § 1.510(a) (1992) states: "Any person may, at any time during the period
of enforceability of a patent, file a request for reexamination by the Patent and Trademark
Office of any claim of the patent on the basis of prior art patents or printed publications cited
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new question of patentability" exists.132 The reexamination,
although an exparte proceeding, may significantly involve the party
requesting the reexamination.'1 s The accused infringer possesses
an important advantage under the reexamination procedure. The
granted reissue enjoys no presumption of validity; instead, the
reexamination is neutral, free of any presumptions.1 '
The
knowledgeable and experienced PTO, rather than an unspecialized
court, conducts this reexamination.
Furthermore, a reissue
proceeding does not bar an accused infringer from using the
affirmative defense of patent invalidity in a subsequent trial. Thus,
if the PTO improperly grants a reissue, the reexamination procedure provides the public and an accused infringer with recourse.
Therefore, based upon the burden of proof considerations, the
proposed expanded reissue provision adequately protects the
patentee. The possibility of a reexamination protects the public.
V. HYPOTHETICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE EXPANDED
REISSUE PROCEDURE

Applying the expanded reissue procedure to past appellate court
cases effectively illustrates the expanded reissue procedure. Graver
Tank,1 s5 arguably the most cited doctrine of equivalents case, is
an appropriate example. This Supreme Court case involved two
electric welding compositions or fluxes. The claims for the fluxes
encompassed a combination of alkaline earth metals. In using the
invention, the patentee combined silicates of calcium and magnesium, two alkaline earth metal silicates. The alleged infringer's
device was similar in all respects except that it used silicates of
under § 1.501.*
'n 35 U.S.C. § 304 (1984); 37 C.F.R. § 1.515 (1992); see also In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 862
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (Nies, J., concurring) ("An infringer may well have evidence which is
sufficient to meet the low threshold of 'a substantial new question of patentability .....
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 828 (1986).
'n E.g., In re Etter, 756 F.2d at 862 (Nies, J., concurring) ('The record in this case shows
that an alleged infringer in litigation forced the reexamination, filed a brief analyzing the
art in connection with its request to the PTO, filed a reply to the patent owner's objection,
was served with copies of the examiner's actions and the patent owner's responses, and was
permitted to intervene and brief matters in this court."); see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.510-60 (1992).
In re Etter, 756 F.2d at 857-58.
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods., 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
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manganese, a non-alkaline earth metal, instead of silicates of
magnesium. The alleged infringer also used the same mechanical
methods, resulting in identical welds. Based upon these similarities and the trial court record, the Court ruled for the patentee,
holding that "[i]t is difficult to conceive of a case more appropriate
for application of the doctrine of equivalents.""
An expansion of the reissue procedure provides a more efficient
way to reach the same result. When the patentee discovered the
alleged infringement, he could apply for a reissue. The proposal
would also permit the patentee to apply for a reissue if he realized
that a copyist could use another metal to infringe his patent or if
manganese was recently discovered (the new technology provision),
thus circumventing intervening rights. In theory, the PTO would
likely reach the same result as the Court and grant the reissue;" 7
the PTO, however, would be a more efficient use of resources since
a specialist in this field would grant the reissue. After the PTO
approved the reissue, the patentee could bring suit for literal
infringement. Since the patentee's claim would now explicitly
encompass manganese, summary judgement for the infringement
would be possible.
In contrast to this illustration of the proposed reissue procedure,
the trial process under the doctrine of equivalents is more complex.
For example, the Supreme Court noted the scope of evaluation
endured by the trial court:
This trial occupied some three weeks, during which,
as the record shows, the trial judge visited laboratories with counsel and experts to observe actual
demonstrations of welding as taught by the patent
and of the welding accused of infringing it, and of
various stages of the prior art. He viewed motion
pictures of various welding operations and tests and
heard many experts and other witnesses. 138

Id. at 612.
But see Wegner, supra note 16, at 28 (noting that as simple matter of chemistry,
Graver Tank holding is incorrect).
18 Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 611 (quoting Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods.,
336 U.S. 271, 274-75 (1949)).
1
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Under the expanded reissue procedure, a trial to resolve the literal
infringement issue would require less resources than the abovedescribed three week hearing because of the benefits of the PTO's
experience and knowledge.
Once the court decides the literal infringement issue under the
expanded reissue procedure, the question of intervening rights
arises if non-literal infringement began prior to the filing date. If
intervening rights are applicable, the patentee has no recourse
until the reissue is granted and the defendant is not liable during
this period. " 9 For the period after the reissue, the court would
decide using equitable considerations whether to allow the
defendant to continue using the flux.1 " Under the facts in
GraverTank, it is likely that the defendant would be judged not to
have rights after the reissue is granted since the record "contain[ed] no evidence of any kind to show that [the defendant's flux]
was developed as the result of independent research or experiments."141 In fact, the Supreme Court in Graver Tank repeatedly
emphasized that the defendant's 1flux
was a product of imitation,
42
not experimentation or invention.
The expanded reissue procedure would consider these important
equitable concerns. Articulation of the function/way/result test,
however, does not facially consider this equitable factor. Thus, the
expanded reissue procedure better incorporates the Supreme
Court's equity rationale than does the present doctrine of equivalents.1 4 Furthermore, under the expanded reissue procedure, the
public could design around the patent claim without the fear of
liability for non-literal infringement.
Another pertinent hypothetical applies the expanded reissue
procedure to the facts of the Wilson Sporting Goods'" case. In
this case, the patented item was a golf ball, constructed with many
dimples on its surface. In the plaintiffs claims, the golf ball design

' See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text (for a discussion of 35 U.S.C. § 252
patent reissue procedures).
140 Id.
14

Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 611.

1421&

"uThis emphasis on equity is important, especially since the doctrine ofequivalents arose
from fairness considerations.
'" Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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included six great circle paths which did not intersect any of these
dimples. The defendant's golf balls also used six great circles, but
the dimples intersected the great circles. A third golf ball, prior art
existing before the plaintiff's patent, also had great circles intersected by dimples. The trial court ruled that the defendants
willfully infringed the plaintiff's patent. On appeal, the CAFC held
that no infringement occurred since the equivalents encompassed
the prior art.14
In this situation, an expanded reissue procedure again would
more efficiently reach the same result. The plaintiff would request
a reissue to expand the scope of its claims to encompass golf balls
with dimples that intersected the six great circles. Prior art would
preclude the reissue, as the CAFC found under these facts. The
plaintiff therefore could not successfully bring an infringement suit.
If the plaintiff did file a complaint, the court would summarily
dismiss it. Thus, the expanded reissue procedure would require
less time, money, and resources to achieve the same result.
As a variation of this hypothetical, the plaintiff could have made
two independent claims during patent prosecution-one for a golf
ball with dimples intersecting the great circles and another for
dimples that did not intersect the great circles. The PTO would
have rejected the first claim based on prior art preclusion. If
another defendant constructed golf balls with dimples intersecting
the great circles, the PTO would deny the plaintiff's reissue
application, precluding the plaintiff from successfully bringing a
literal infringement suit. Although under the present system a
district court would reach the same conclusion, the expanded
reissue procedure is less expensive and more efficient for the
parties, the court, and the public.
VI. CONCLUSION

From its origins, the purpose of the doctrine of equivalents was
to protect the patentee. Today, the doctrine supports the same
goal, but many problems have arisen. An expanded reissue
procedure eliminates many of the problems and uncertainties
created by the doctrine of equivalents, while satisfying the same
"4

I& at 686.
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objectives.
An expanded reissue procedure provides numerous advantages
over the judicially created doctrine of equivalents. First, and most
importantly, the reissue proposal better meets the Constitutional
mandate to promote the useful arts by allowing the public to design
around patents. The expanded reissue procedure additionally
would result in more consistent decisions by using the PTO's
expertise. This proposal would also alleviate problems that the
federal courts experience with the doctrine of equivalents. By using
the PTO, the expanded reissue procedure would be more efficient
for the courts and the litigants.
Congressional adoption of the expanded reissue procedure would
assign adjudication of patent equivalents to the PTO instead of to
the federal courts. This system would use resources more effectively than under the doctrine of equivalents because the PTO would
decide technical matters. The court would then determine whether
there was a literal infringement under the reissue patent. If the
court found literal infringement, it would determine associated
damages and equitable relief. This simple solution is better than
the present uncertainty created by the doctrine of equivalents. The
Supreme Court in Graver Tank noted that literal infringement is
"dull,"1 but considering the many problems plaguing the doctrine of equivalents, there is something to be said for a court only
deciding a mundane, or "dull," type of infringement.
ALLAN G. ALTERA

" GraverTank, 339 U.S. at 607.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol1/iss1/10

34

